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Abstract
In a eld already investigated extensively, the article focuses on a particular aspect, 
namely on the nature of the interaction between the self and the other. e leading 
question is: What is the hermeneutical potential of the other and the stranger in 
relation to the self? e following dimensions are examined: the direction of ow of 
the interaction, the power relations involved in the process, the claim of the other on 
the self and the existential dimensions of strangeness.
e rst section examines various approaches to the other in a number of disciplines: 
anthropology and ethnology, art and art history, religion, philosophy, communication 
theory, and pedagogy. Several common traits are evident: e ow of action is pre-
dominantly from the self to the other; the power relationship is unequal, skewed in 
favour of the self; the other is rarely perceived in his or her own right but is compared 
with the self who serves as norm; and strangeness is seen as inherently problematic 
and accompanied by negative connotations. ere is consequently a constant attempt 
to scale down dierences and to domesticate the other by various means.
An alternative approach aims at reversing the normal power relationship and releasing 
the potential of change for the self in the encounter with the other. is requires a 
conscious decision to change the direction of action – from the other to the self and not 
vice versa. Furthermore, to break the binary hold of subject on object, the decentring 
of the subject is necessary. is requires the recognition of the “incompleteness” of 
human existence (Nyamnjoh) which opens the self for new possibilities. Acceptance 
of the radical openness of systems (in this case the “system” of human relationships) 
is the key to release the “excess” of potential available to the self in the encounter with 
the other and with what is strange and alien.
In this context, the strategies of liberating and of enrichment through the other 
becomes important. Even when considering the dark side of strangeness, these 
strategies still apply and illustrate more clearly the existential necessity of strangeness. 
e potential of the other and of strangeness for liberating and enriching the self 
remains undervalued.
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1. Introduction
Why is strangeness both alluring and threatening? Why do others attract 
as well as repel us? From the very beginning of our self-awareness, the other 
has been a constant companion and the unknown the persistent counterfoil 
of what is familiar to us. In fact, the very emergence of a sense of self is due 
to the realisation that I am not the other that I exist in distinction from 
others. “Own” is dened in terms of what is dierent from and strange to 
me.
But, as Simmel already argued, the strangeness characterising human 
relations is not something exterior to ourselves. For him, the stranger is not 
a wanderer who comes today and goes tomorrow, but rather “the person who 
comes today and stays to morrow (sic)” (1950 [1908]:402). e relationship 
with the other is characterised by both nearness and remoteness. e 
stranger who is close by is at the same time far and although far, he or she 
is actually near.
Strangeness and the other are therefore deeply embedded in human 
consciousness and are themes that inuenced large domains of human 
thought, including history, literature, philosophy, psychology, theology and 
many others. e literature on the “other” and the “stranger” is seemingly 
endless,1 raising the legitimate question whether anything new can be said 
on the subject.
e background of this article is a wider research project undertaken 
by the Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study under the title “Being 
Human Today”. is project originated from the realization that aer 
twenty years of a new democratic dispensation in South Africa, many of 
the expectations of 1994 remain unfullled. More specically, the more 
1 To mention just a few authors beside numerous others: Buber (1970), Levinas (1978, 
1987), Kristeva (1991), Ricoeur (1992) and Kearney (2003). e South African context, 
the contributions of Adam & Moodley (2014), Smit (2017) and Vosloo (2006, 2009, and 
2015) are recent examples.
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humane society that was so fervently anticipated seems to be more remote 
than ever. e project consequently explores two interrelated questions:
What does it mean to be human? And: What is the nature of the 
world in which we aspire to be human?2
A more “humane” society depends essentially on the nature of the 
interrelations between individuals and groups. In a context like South 
Africa which is characterised by wide-ranging diversity and high levels 
of inequality, achieving constructive relations is not only a challenge, 
but co-existence itself can be threatened if strangeness becomes the 
dominant factor. As Benjamin (1991:697–698) has reminded us, human 
history (despite it remarkable achievements) is also riddled by continuing 
incidents of conict, xenophobia, war and destruction. e understanding 
of and the interaction with the stranger is therefore not only of “academic” 
signicance, but one of the great existential challenges of our time.
is contribution is not intended as a comprehensive overview of the eld 
in any sense. Its focus is restricted to one aspect, namely the nature of the 
interaction between the “self” and the “other”, and more specically, to the 
question: What is the hermeneutical potential of the other and the stranger 
in this process? Would it be possible to think of strangeness as an asset 
and as an opportunity? To explore these possibilities, we need to examine 
in more detail the direction in which the interaction normally takes place, 
2 “To start with the second: What characterizes the context in which individuals and 
societies nd themselves in the rst half of the 21st century? It has variously been 
described as the technological age, as a globalized world, as a network society, as 
‘postmodern’. All of these descriptors refer to an important aspect, but hardly covers 
the whole. Perhaps the most striking feature is our growing awareness of the complexity 
of our world and the realization that developments on the social, economic, political, 
technological and other fronts interact and aect each other. e piece-meal, sectorial, 
oversimplied models of society, coupled with our fragmented understanding of 
science and of the planet have potentially destructive consequences for the world, but 
also for our humanity. Our context forces us to continue our exploration of the physical 
and biological world. In doing so we also have to reect on the rst question, namely 
the fundamental issue of how our humanity is constituted. is gives rise to further 
questions, for example how our understanding of humanity is inuenced by these 
contextual factors and what kind of human society/societies are emerging from this 
interaction” (http://stias.ac.za/research/themes/being-human-today/).
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the power relations at stake here and the claim the other makes on the self 
in the process.3
e rst section provides a brief analysis of how dierent approaches 
conceive of the interaction with the other/stranger4 where the latter is 
perceived as “object”. en the focus is reversed: What happens when the 
subject becomes object? What is the eect of the stranger and of strangeness 
on the self? From this perspective, an alternative approach is developed 
before reaching a conclusion.
2. Conceptions of the interaction between the self and the 
other/stranger
As indicated above, the pursuit of a “more human” society in post-1994 South 
Africa – whether described in terms of ubuntu, social cohesion, inclusive 
democracy or an open and free system – depends on the relationships 
between its citizens. More specically, on whether these relationships are 
experienced as positive, constructive, empowering and liberating.
e relationship with the “other” provides the basis of our social matrix. 
It begins with the self-awareness of the individual or the group. is 
self-awareness is the consequence of the experience of dierentiation, of 
distance from the “non-I” or the “non-us”. Without the experience and 
consciousness of the “other”, there is no “I”.
One consequence of this process of consciousness formation is that 
from the very beginning the “non-I” has the potential to attract negative 
associations. is tendency covers the whole spectrum from mere “neutral” 
variation to the experience of the other as strange, as threatening or even as 
3 “Self” is used in this article to refer to the consciousness of own existence. It is the 
consciousness that I exist as a person in distinction from others. e terms selood and 
identity are also used in this regard, although each has its own nuances.
4 “Other” and “stranger” are used interchangeably in this article, marking two points on 
a scale. Although the “other” is not necessarily “strange”, it is nonetheless a “non-I”. 
Both terms derive their specic prole in contrast to the consciousness of “self”. It is 
merely a dierence in degree – the “stranger” is further removed from the “I” than the 
“other”.
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a “monster” (Kearney 2003).5 “Dierent”, “strange” and “enemy” represent 
merely dierent stages along one and the same trajectory.
is kind of thinking is true not only of individuals – larger entities like 
nations and even whole “civilizations” exhibit the same tendency. In his 
remarkable book Orientalism Edward Said makes clear how during the 
eighteenth century a certain “attitude” towards the East came to the fore 
which permeated almost all aspects of European society. is attitude had 
its deepest roots in the experience of strangeness – the “Orient” was for 
Europe of the time “one of its deepest and most recurring images of the 
Other” (Said 1991:1).
It is furthermore important to note that in this process the focus is 
consistently one-directional – originating from the subject and directed 
to that which is experienced by this subject as strange. “Strange” is strange 
in relationship to the knowing/experiencing subject. e focus is on who 
and what the stranger is, how the stranger should be understood, and how 
one should behave towards the stranger. As in the case of diversity (be it in 
terms of culture, race, gender or function) the phenomenon itself (diversity 
or strangeness) is understood as being inherently problematic (or at least 
potentially problematic)6. It is something uncomfortable, even threatening, 
and therefore needs to be neutralised or ameliorated in some way. e 
subject-dominated nature of this discourse is one of its most prominent 
(but at the same time most underestimated) characteristics.
is line of thinking therefore oen leads to attempts to “domesticate” the 
stranger by more or lesser aggressive means – by annexation, assimilation, 
suiwering (“cleansing”), neutralisation, transformation, conversion, “re-
education”, incorporation, subjection, enslavement – or even elimination. 
e stranger is the “entity” supposed to undergo these actions – willingly 
or unwillingly, oen ending in the use of force. It is the stranger who should 
be tamed, the “devil” who needs to be exorcised.
But what if we reverse the perspective and ask: What happens to the 
antagonist of the stranger in the process? How does it aect the subject 
5 Streib (2005:236–238) distinguishes between further nuances of strangeness: 
“xenophobic anxiety”, xenophobic fear”, “dissonance”, “threat and challenge”.
6 Cf. Lategan 1999.
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from whom the attempt to decrease or eliminate strangeness emanates in 
the rst place?
ese counter questions remain theoretical if dominant pattern continues, 
that is, when the focus is on the stranger while the self retains control and 
serves as the criterion against which the stranger is judged. How pervasive 
this pattern is, becomes clear when we look at some examples from a variety 
of disciplines.
2.1 Anthropological and ethnographic perspectives
With its focus on the characteristics of dierent peoples, anthropology and 
more specically the sub-discipline ethnology have a natural interest in 
the unfamiliar and the strange as far as culture and social relationships 
are concerned. But even before the era of scientic description, the 
attitudes of individuals and groups when entering unknown territory 
and encountering strange people, already displayed certain patterns. As 
Todorov (1982) has shown, the great “voyages of discovery” of the eenth 
century oer intriguing examples in this regard. He distinguishes four 
types of responses to the unfamiliar:
e rst is illustrated by the attitude of Columbus himself – he does not 
discover America but rather nds it. Inspired by his faith, he travels west to 
bring Christianity to India and to conquer the new world for the Spanish 
royal couple. ere he nds not the unfamiliar, but the familiar – in line 
with his expectations. Instead of learning local languages, he takes a few 
inhabitants to Europe in order that they “may learn to speak”. Columbus 
thus discovers Europe in America – the unfamiliar is only temporarily 
strange and compatible with the self.
Las Casas also proceeds from the equality of all humans, but goes a step 
further. e human dignity of the Indians should be protected in view 
of the injustices inicted on them by their Spanish conquerors. e local 
inhabitants should therefore be understood in terms of their own culture. 
If the two sides do not know the other’s language, the other will remain a 
barbarian in the eyes of the other.
e third position represents the opposite of this view. Here the basic 
inequality of humans is the premise and the focus is on the dierence 
between people – leading inevitably to denigration and contempt. In its 
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extreme form, the Indian population is described as people who can only 
be compared to animals.
e fourth model also takes the otherness of the stranger as point of 
departure, but transforms this into a utopian ideal. e Indian becomes the 
ideal to which all humans should aspire. is leads to divergent responses: 
For some, it implies a quest for complete (or at least partial) identication 
with the other, but for others it serves as a further motivation for subjecting 
the indigenous population (Sundermeier 1996:23).
Despite the profound dierences between these responses, they share one 
common trait, namely the asymmetry in the relationship with the stranger. 
e initiative, conceptualisation and action do not proceed from the 
stranger, but from the subject who experiences the other as strange in the 
rst place. Although somebody like Las Casas wants to protect the dignity 
of the stranger, the conqueror retains the dominant position. Sundermeier 
describes the situation succinctly: e stranger is not perceived as stranger. 
What the eenth century European sees when he looks at the new 
world, is a mirror image of himself – an image which either conrms 
his self-understanding or contradicts it. e result is a deeply embedded 
ethical attitude with dire consequences: assimilation, subjection or even 
annihilation.
For a long time, anthropology followed the same contours in its scientic 
orientation. A shi only occurred at the beginning of the twentieth century 
when Malinowski introduced his “bare-foot” approach and the idea of 
“participant- observation”. e stranger suddenly became the centre of 
attention. By learning local languages and participating in the every-day 
life of communities, the goal was to see and experience the world “through 
the eyes of the other”.
But who was eventually served by this approach? e stranger was still not 
observed for his or her own sake. According to Sundermeier, the greatest 
beneciary of the process was ethnography as scientic enterprise who 
used this approach to establish its own methods and scientic procedures – 
either by using the sociological insights of Durkheim to analyse the social 
function of each rite, or by searching with Lévi-Strauss for the universal 
code underlying social structures with the help of structuralism. But 
in the process the distance from the stranger as stranger increases. 
274 Lategan  •  STJ 2018, Vol 4, No 1, 267–296
Social anthropology certainly shows a greater awareness of the role of 
the researcher and of his or her inuence on the results obtained by the 
scientic endeavour. But even here the detour via the stranger in the ends 
leads back to the self (Sundermeier 1996:29).
2.2 Art and art-historical perspectives
Can insights from art and the history of art help us further? Artists, aer 
all, act as the seismographers of their time who anticipate tremors and 
impending shis long in advance – and reect that in their work. Especially 
the unfamiliar and the stranger are observed through dierent eyes and 
represented in unusual ways. Great art is therefore oen ahead of its time, 
experienced by contemporaries of the artist as weird and disturbing, only 
to become “normal” over time.
Since the eenth century, the history of art by and large reected the 
general fascination of Europe with the “new world”. Here too, inhabitants 
of America and their customs were not observed in their own right, but 
represented in terms of the European ideal of beauty of the time – a trend 
that continued into the twentieth century. A well-known example is Gaugin 
who leaves Paris in 1890 on his rst visit to Tahiti with the explicit purpose to 
escape everything articial and conventional (Mathews 2001:157–167). Like 
Malinowski would do later, he learns a local language and becomes fully 
part of everyday life. His style of painting also changes, but his real viewing 
public remains the art circles of Paris for whom his paintings are intended. 
As Sundermeier aptly remarks: “Der europäische Künstler geht zwar aus 
seinem Lande, aber er geht nicht aus sich heraus” (2001:41). Likewise, 
Picasso and some of his contemporaries at the beginning of the twentieth 
century like Vlaminck and Derain nd inspiration in strange worlds and 
cultures, without making these their own. As is well known, Picasso was 
strongly inuenced by examples of African art, especially the masks which 
he discovered in the then Musée d”Ethnographie and which were the direct 
inspiration for his painting Les Demoiselles d”Avignon (Leighton 1990:625). 
Although he tried to deny it later (“L”art négre? Connais pas!”/ African art? 
Don’t know it! – cf. Howlett 1951:85), the inuence is unmistakable. It is 
the “primitive” of Africa which attracts him and enables him to oer – via 
his art – a critique of that which he experiences as the European decadence 
of his time. Nonetheless, his public and his intellectual frame of reference 
remain Europe – which is all the more ironic because his convictions were 
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in essence anti-colonial and his work was intended as a protest against the 
atrocities of Belgium and France in Africa (Leighton 1990:626).
2.3 Religious perspectives
In view of the fact that the stranger occupies an important place in most 
religions and that love for the neighbour is proclaimed by many as a general 
ethical ideal, one could expect important perspectives on our theme. e 
three “religions of the book” (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) place a 
high premium on the obligation of hospitality, on the respectful and just 
treatment of strangers, and on charity towards all. e protection of and care 
for “the stranger within your gates” is a recurring theme and this stranger 
is even explicitly included in the commandment on the Sabbath (Exodus 
20:10). In Islam, hospitality and respect towards strangers are likewise of 
the utmost importance. It is a right as well as a God-given obligation for 
which the Quran provides extensive directives, referring among other 
examples to the conduct of Abraham towards his guests (Quran 51:24–27).
Nevertheless, in these ethical injunctions the focus is not on the stranger 
as such nor on the implications for the self-understanding of the 
believer. e stranger does not challenge the boundaries of the believing 
community – on the contrary, the goal is rather the inclusion of the stranger 
in this community. Despite other dierences, the basic approach is that of 
the missionary. e stranger is per denition an outsider, and therefore 
the one in need of conversion, change, education, inclusion or integration 
in the (already existing) community of believers. It is the other who lacks 
something, whose thinking and behaviour need to be altered. e method 
can be brutal or subtle – ranging from conversion and baptism by force to 
the most rened forms of persuasion, oen with the willing cooperation of 
the convert him- or herself. e power relationship remains unequal. e 
convictions of the missionary are not on the line7, but those of the target of 
conversion. It does not really matter with what motives or in what spirit the 
interaction takes place – with what heroic self-sacrice, what self-denying 
commitment, what admirable integrity or sincerity. e direction remains 
the same and the expected result (the conversion of the other) unchanged.
7 Grünschloss (1999:297) speaks in this regard (with reference to the encyclical Nostra 
Aetate 2) of a “hermeneutisch unüberwinbare” position because the own horizon of 
understanding can never be relinquished.
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2.4 Philosophical perspectives
Perhaps more extensively than any other discipline, philosophy from its 
earliest beginnings has concerned itself with the theme of strangeness and 
of the “other”. Already in his Symposium (section 189–193) Plato recalls a 
myth told by Aristophanes to explain the deepest ground of our longing for 
the other. Originally, humans were created with four arms, four legs and a 
head with two faces. Fearing their power, Zeus split them into two separate 
parts, condemning them to spend their lives in search for their other 
halves. Love is simply the name of the desire for and pursuit of the whole, 
be it between man and woman, man and man, or woman and woman. is 
longing is more than mere yearning for the other person, but encompasses 
also the search for all that is good, wise and beautiful. (We shall return to 
this idea of a lost unity, of a wholeness that needs to be restored).
In the course of time, this primordial desire has been conceptualised and 
interpreted in a wide variety of ways. However, as Sundermeier (1996:53–
54) makes clear, the switch-points and consequently the direction of this 
desire were programmed from the start, resulting in three basic models 
of the relationship with the other. In all three the initiative remains in the 
hands of the subject. e rst is based on the discovery of the self in the 
other. e other serves as mirror for recognition and armation of the self. 
e second focuses on similarities rather than on the self – on that which 
I share with the other. is provides the impetus to strive for consensus, 
harmony and peace. e third, “realistic” model takes the opposite as point 
of departure – dierences should not be glossed over, but negotiated. e 
aim is not so much to understand the other, but to nd suitable ways how 
to deal constructively with dierences.
Important for our theme is that all three models attempt – in various 
ways – to reduce, suspend or even eliminate the strangeness of the other. 
Even in the case of the third which acknowledges the reality of dierences, 
the aim is to bridge or negotiate them8.
Does reection on the other reveal dierent trajectories in the subsequent 
history of philosophy? How is the interaction between the self and the 
8 “Die Gegensätze sollen durch das Tun des Guten überwinden, das Schlechte, Fremde 
und Häßliche in der gemeinsame Anstrengung abgelegt und ausgeschaltet werden” 
(Sundermeier 1996:54).
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other conceptualised by later thinkers? Restricting ourselves to this specic 
aspect and without attempting a comprehensive analysis in any sense, we 
shall look at only four eclectically chosen representatives: Hegel, Husserl, 
Buber and Levinas.
Hegel’s well-known dialectical approach which he applied to wide variety 
of elds (most prominently to history) is the result of his “phenomenology 
of the spirit” in which he attempts to reach down to the core of human 
consciousness. For him, this consciousness is characterised by both 
independence and dependence, which in their turn create the conditions 
for dominance and subjection. e individual cannot attain truth on 
his own – for this, the other is needed. However, this interdependence 
presupposes a tension which can only be resolved by contest and struggle. 
Conict should therefore neither be avoided nor diluted – it enables us to 
discover the contours of the truth that much clearer. e important point 
for our purpose is the emphasis Hegel places on understanding the nature 
of the interaction between the self and the other.
Husserl pursues the phenomenological trajectory further but develops a 
more complex understanding of the other. He does not take history as his 
point of departure, but wants to get below the surface of phenomena to 
comprehend the inner structure of human existence. rough a process of 
phenomenological reduction and intuition (“Einfühlung”) he is looking for 
the “primordial being” (“Ur-Ich”) which is divested of all that is strange. e 
interesting point is that in this process the stranger plays an important role. 
e rst step is to distance the “authentic self” (“Mir-Eigene”) from what 
is unfamiliar. However, for this the presence of the stranger is needed. e 
route to self-discovery goes via the stranger, but at the same time the latter 
is rendered accessible by searching for points of similarity. e self remains 
both point of departure and criterion by which the stranger is evaluated. As 
Waldenfels (1989:53) points out, the self-functions as “Vorlage, als Original 
für das Fremde”. e strangeness of the stranger is thereby eectively 
neutralised. Even more – the relationship with the stranger presupposes 
no dynamic, vibrant interaction. It is merely the sterile denotation of the 
boundaries of the self, of that which lies outside the self.
Can Martin Buber, the famed exponent of the I/ou relationship and 
the champion of the “dialogical principal” help us further? For him, the 
relationship with the other is certainly dynamic, but the remarkable shi 
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in his thinking is that the self no longer occupies the dominant position. 
e self does not exist on its own, but becomes the “self” through the other, 
is only possible by the grace of the other9. e other is constitutive for the 
self and for human existence überhaupt.
Although Buber does away with the customary inequality between the self 
and the other, a dierent problem arises. e other is longer overwhelmed 
by the self and provides the essential counterpoint for the I/you relationship 
to function. But in the process, the other is deprived of its strangeness. As 
constituent element of the self it becomes part of the self and is therefore 
no longer “strange”. Is the advantage which strangeness might oer thereby 
lost?
In this regard, the approach of Levinas signals a fundamental shi. is 
change is the outcome of a life-long quest to understand the face-to-
face encounter with the other as well as the ethical implications which 
ow from this encounter. He consequently develops a totally dierent 
understanding of the power relations between the self and the other which 
leads his thinking in new directions and results in what Bergo (2015) calls 
a “hermeneutics of lived experience in the world”10.
His distinctive approach is informed by three, interrelated factors. e 
rst is what can be called a “de-centring” of the self. e self is no longer 
the centre pin around which all else revolve, the dominant partner in the 
relationship with the other, the default criterion for the assessment of 
others, the one who needs to be armed in his or her self-understanding 
by the other, or the natural beneciary of the encounter with the other. 
Secondly, the perspective is reversed from the other to the self. e other 
is no longer the “object” which the self needs to understand, deal with or, 
if need be, exorcize. In so far as the focus is on the self, the aim is not to 
satisfy the needs of the self, but to understand the claim which other makes 
9 Buber 1970:62: “I require a You to become: becoming I, I say You. All actual life is 
encounter”
10 “Levinas’s philosophical project can be called constructivist. He proposes 
phenomenological description and a hermeneutics of lived experience in the world. 
He lays bare levels of experience described neither by Husserl nor by Heidegger. ese 
layers of experience concern the encounter with the world, with the human other, and 
a reconstruction of a layered interiority characterized by sensibility and aectivity” 
(Bergo 2015:1).
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on the self. irdly, the self is liberated by the encounter with the other. 
is liberation is in the rst place a release from the restrictions of the 
self and from the connes of the subject/object binary. At the same time, 
it is the freedom to break new ground, to set o on a journey, to explore 
the unfamiliar. “Levinas will unterwegs sein, wie Odysseus” (Sundermeier 
1996:63).
But – and that is the big dierence with Odysseus and also with Nietzsche 
and his “Verlangen nach Wanderscha, Fremde, Entfremdung, Erkältung, 
Ernüchterung, Vereisung (2013 [1886]; vii–viii) – the voyage into the 
unknown is not meant as a mere detour to return again in the end to 
the familiar. e focus on the other, the strange and the unfamiliar is a 
permanent attitude of openness to other possibilities and for a focus on the 
future. For Ricoeur (1992:318) this openness assumes almost ontological 
dimensions – what Atkins (2017) describes as a “primordial openness”.
Not only is the perspective reversed, the power relations altered, but the 
initiative has also changed hands. It is the other as stranger who elicits a 
response. e face-to-face confrontation with the other thus enables the 
rst step towards changing the self.
e ideas of Levinas did not receive general acceptance and he remains a 
controversial gure11. His approach nonetheless contains important points 
of departure for an alternative appreciation of the other.
2.5 Perspectives from communication theory
Despite the valuable insights philosophy has to oer for our theme, there 
are also some limitations. ese concern – ironically enough – especially 
the philosophical tradition which one would expect to contribute most 
to clarifying the relationship with the other, namely hermeneutics12. 
To explain why this is the case, we need to look more closely at how 
hermeneutics conceptualizes the process of understanding – in this case 
the understanding of the other and the stranger.
11 Cf. for example Žižek (2005) and Hand (2009:109–121).
12 During the second half of the twentieth century this approach became especially 
prominent with many well-known exponents like Husserl, Dilthey, Heidegger, 
Gadamer, and Ricoeur in philosophy and Bultmann, Fuchs, Ebeling, and Jüngel in 
theology.
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Hermeneutics aims to oer more than communication theory or techniques 
of formal explanation, but wants to come to grips with human understanding 
as such. In this process, re-cognition13 plays an important role. ere already 
exists in the other some measure of communality on which to build – in 
fact, the ideal is for the horizon of the self to overlap with that of the other. 
is “merging of horizons”14 represents for Gadamer (the most famous 
exponent of this approach) the real goal of understanding. e dierence 
of the other and the strangeness of the stranger need to be dissolved by 
the process of merging. e self-understanding (Selbstverständnis) of the 
subject remains the focal point – not the understanding of the other.
Although Gadamer made a major contribution to the advancement of 
hermeneutics in general, the quest for the merging of horizons has the 
(unintended) eect of encouraging the assimilation or elimination of 
strangeness and is therefore not very helpful for our purposes. In fact, is the 
expectation of such an overlapping and merging realistic in the rst place? 
Is “understanding” in this sense really possible? Would a more modest 
ideal, like that of consensus, not be more achievable?
More than any of his contemporaries, Habermas pursued this ideal of 
consensus. It lies at the root of his eorie des kommunikativen Handels 
(1987) in which he expounds his ideas of rational behaviour (“Handlungs-
rationalität) and processes of social rationalisation (“Gesellschaliche 
Rationalisierung”). A major contributing factor to his thinking was 
the student revolt of 1968 in Paris, which subsequently spread to other 
European cities. ese protests were so disruptive and the communication 
between authorities and students so dysfunctional (the parallel with the 
2016 student protests in South Africa immediately springs to mind!), that 
it became a serious question whether real understanding between the 1968 
generation of young people and the incumbent authorities was indeed 
possible. A new approach was urgently needed. Against this background 
Habermas developed his strategy of sustained dialogue and rational 
communication. His proposals found wide acceptance, underlining the 
dire need for a more constructive handling of social conict and of the 
tensions between older and younger generations. His views no doubt gave 
13 Gadamer 1972:357: “Zwar ist es richtig, daß alles Verstehen von Texten der Philosophie 
Wiedererkenntnis des in ihnen Erkannten verlangt”.
14 “Horizonverschmeltzung” (Gadamer 1972:289, 375).
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new impetus to a democratic culture of open communication and to a shi 
in the direction of persuasion and consensus rather than confrontation 
and violence.
What is not always so clear is that the approach of Habermas can let 
important aspects of our theme recede into the background. e pursuit of 
consensus is only possible by means of a process of restriction on the one 
hand and of conformation on the other hand. He correctly understands 
that inequality hinders eective communication and that all participants 
should have an equal opportunity to participate and to be heard. But this 
requires a prior commitment by all involved to keep to certain rules of the 
game and furthermore that there is a sucient degree of overlap between 
the “life-worlds” (Habermas’s term) of participants to enable a dialogue 
and the reaching of consensus. As far as the rst is concerned, eliminating 
any form of inequality or hierarchy among participants proves to be very 
dicult in actual practice. As far as the second is concerned, there is 
only a narrow band of “life-worlds” which accepts rational persuasion as 
ground-rule. In reality, it remains restricted to certain forms of (Western) 
democracy and excludes for example a “mythical” understanding of the 
world (cf. Nyamnjoh 2017).
e preconditions required by Habermas for reaching the desired consensus 
thus imply a certain narrowing down of the mode of communication 
(rational dialogue) as well as the equalisation of power relations, which 
renders his approach less suitable for our specic purpose.
2.6 Pedagogical perspectives
e dominant role of the self in relation to the other seems to be so 
entrenched that even in cases where there is a deliberate attempt to interact 
with the stranger, the initiative, evaluation, and the structuring of the 
discourse still emanate from the self.
It is therefore surprising that new perspectives emerge from an unexpected 
quarter, namely from pedagogy. Although the education process can also 
be one-sided when the educator remains in control with the learner per 
denition as the designated recipient, the ultimate goal is an eective 
learning experience. In contrast to “convert”, “learn” implies a two-way 
encounter which makes it in principle possible to reverse the direction of 
interaction.
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Interestingly enough, it is the practical experience gained in teaching 
religion in a multi-religious and multi-cultural setting that led to a situation 
where a one-directional approach is increasingly being replaced by a two-
way interaction, simply because the former has no chance of success. In 
this regard, two guidelines are important. Firstly, the dierences between 
one’s own and other religion(s) should neither be denied nor glossed over 
and secondly, accepting that in the interaction one’s own convictions are 
inevitably placed at risk. “Bevor somit interreligiöses Lernen didaktisch 
modelliert werden kann, bedarf es einer Hermeneutik des Fremden, die 
grundlegend danach fragt, wie der oder das Fremde, Andere, Dierente 
wahrgenommen und erschlossen werden kann” (Gärtner 2015:1).
It is in this context and to counter the tendency in inter-religious discourse 
to strive for uniformity and to underplay dierences that Sundermeier 
(1996:132–136) develops his “Dierenzhermeneutik”. rough a kind of 
“osmotic exchange” in the interaction with the other, it becomes possible 
to construct an own identity in distinction from but at the same time in 
relation to other identities.
e emphasis on the reciprocal nature of the interchange between the self 
and the other also implies that the possibility of failed communication 
and of misunderstanding remains open. It is only in the one-directional 
model where the initiative and control remain in the hands of the self and 
where the optimistic expectation of communication that will always be 
successful can be maintained. Bennett (2002:34–38) refers in this regard 
to the “potential of resistance” which is always present in the interaction 
with the other. Understanding remains a process, moving through phases 
of denial, justication, relativizing, acceptance, adaptation and integration 
of dierences.
In this regard, Streib (2005:236–238) provides an interesting typology of 
dierent styles in dealing with strangeness. e style which experiences 
strangeness as resistance and as challenge is of special signicance for 
our theme. Streib is concerned with the “Mehrwert” (added value) which 
strangeness can contribute to the benet of one’s own identity. It is this 
potential “prot” inherently present in strangeness which holds the key for 
an alternative approach to the other which should be pursued further.
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3. Outline of an alternative approach
e preceding discussion makes clear how complex the encounter with 
the other and the dealing with strangeness can be. Furthermore, these 
interactions are predominantly negative. e other and the stranger 
remain in essence problematic and a potential threat which needs to be 
negotiated in a variety of ways. At the same time, the subject retains the 
dominant position. If the further question is asked how the interaction 
with the other and stranger can contribute to ensure a more “humane” 
society, the challenge becomes even more formidable.
But can one realistically expect anything dierent? Syntactically and 
logically speaking, the subject remains the initiator of action – action which 
ows from subject to object. Furthermore – the other comes into view 
because there already exists a subject who is observing. e “other” and 
“stranger” are dierent and unfamiliar in relation to, from the perspective 
of and in terms of the experience of the self.
Is an alternative approach imaginable? at is, an alternative to the 
“standard model” and which is therefore bound to be “contra-intuitive”? 
With this goal in mind, let us return to two themes we have already touched 
on: Humankind’s yearning for a lost completeness and the etymological 
roots of the term “stranger”.
With regard to the former: Although the myth of Aristophanes as 
recalled by Plato focuses in the rst instance on the pining of separated 
individuals for the missing other, it forms part of a much deeper and wider 
yearning, namely the longing for the lost completeness of our existence. 
Since this initial separation, the human condition is characterised by an 
enduring sense of incompleteness. For Nyamnjoh (2015), the experience 
of “incompleteness” has important consequences for our life with others15. 
It not only underlines our dependence on others, but calls for humbleness 
in the sense that we are not the sole controllers of our fate. It encourages 
“conviviality”, that is, the willingness to reach out and to form constructive 
15 e opposite of this is a sense of complacency (cf. Levinas 2003:51). “Incompleteness” 
does not mean the loss of agency or that the self is dissolved in in a vague relativity. It 
rather signals a deep sense of being in want that more is possible. It engenders a sense 
of modesty – in contrast to one of self-satisfaction.
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relationships with others. is represents the rst step towards the de-
centring the subject, to which we shall return below.
Secondly, it is useful to trace the etymological roots of the term “stranger”, 
while bearing in mind that it is risky to infer the meaning of words from 
their history. is is not our intention, but rather to point to a trace that 
was indeed part of the original root, but which was lost during the later 
development of the word. Xenos in Greek originally had two meanings: 
“guest” and “stranger” (Liddle and Scott 1953:1189).16 e guest is not 
necessarily unknown, but strange in the sense that he or she is not part 
of the normal household. e guest is nonetheless welcomed and becomes 
part of the family in the most intimate way. Xenia (“friendship towards 
the guest”)17 and respect form part of the sacred duty towards the stranger 
who aer all might be a god in disguise. e same custom is found in other 
cultures. In Mali the front room of the house with a door to the street 
is traditionally reserved for the guest while the family occupies the back 
quarters. In rural South Africa stories are told where the family had to forgo 
their meal to serve an (unexpected) guest. Such gestures of hospitality and 
respect stand in sharp contrast to the negativity usually associated with 
the stranger.
ese two issues already point us in the direction of an alternative approach. 
However, in order to be convincing, this will require a more comprehensive 
proposal to address all the relevant and inter-related aspects – a task well 
beyond this preliminary investigation. Here we shall only outline in broad 
terms the contours of such an approach. e basic building blocks for this 
purpose already became evident in the discussion of Levinas and can now 
be taken a step further.
e rst concerns a changed attitude towards the other and the stranger. In 
view of the customary tendency to regard either as negative or as a threat, 
it will require a conscious decision to focus on the positive aspects of the 
relationship. By this is meant more than a friendly disposition or benign 
tolerance, but being able to recognise the hidden and oen mis-appreciated 
16 We nd the same duality in Latin. In his work on hospitality, Derrida points out that 
hostis can refer to both “enemy” and “host” (cf. Kearney 2002:10–11).
17 e German “Gastfreundscha” retains the idea of friendship, while the Afrikaans and 
Dutch equivalent “gasvryheid” alludes to the generous treatment of the guest.
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potential available in the other. Waldenfels makes the important point that 
we are dealing here with an “Überschuss”18, a surplus which both precedes 
the interaction with the other as well as supersedes it.19 But this requires an 
openness towards this excess. It is precisely the reduction of the other to 
what is known or acceptable to me which silences the other and deprives us 
from seeing the potential inherent in the stranger.
Above we referred to a similar statement by Streib about the “added value” 
which strangeness can contribute to the own identity. Both Waldenfels and 
Streib requires us to look at the stranger through dierent eyes – not in the 
rst place as a problem or a threat, but as a potential source for enrichment, 
expansion and renewal.
At the same time, it should constantly be kept in mind that the added 
value of the stranger can only be unlocked if the integrity of the stranger 
remains in place. To put it dierently, the stranger should be engaged to 
the full extent of his or her strangeness – not in a toned down, sanitized 
or user-friendly version. is means a willingness to face strangeness 
in its full extent, in all its rawness, in its oen upsetting and shocking 
reality. e own view of reality and socialized stereotypes are usually so 
deeply ingrained that it requires unusual measures to pry them loose. at 
is why Führing (1996:116) stresses the “potential to irritate” inherent in 
strangeness, because this can be the trigger to discover alternatives. In 
the same spirit Kristeva enjoins us to appreciate strangeness as catalyst. 
She therefore becomes a champion for the “disruptive and transformative 
powers of semiotic “otherness” (Kearney 1994:337). Kearney himself refers 
to the “limit-experiences” which we can encounter in the presence of 
“strangers, gods and monsters”. “ey subvert our established categories 
and challenge us to think again” (2003:3).
e open, unrestricted encounter with the other at the same time 
presupposes a willingness to leave the comfort of “home”. As transpired 
from our discussion of Levinas, it requires a “Wanderlust”, an adventurous 
18 It concerns “… einen Überschuss, der aller Fremdbetrachtung und Fremdbehandlung 
vorausgeht und über sie hinausgeht. Nicht nur die Reduktion von Fremdem auf Eigenes, 
auch der Versuch einer Synthese zwischen beiden gehört zu den Gewalttaten, die den 
Anspruch des Fremden zum Verstummen bringen” (Waldenfels 2004:322).
19 Ziarek (1995:19) talks in this regard of the “excess of alterity”.
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spirit without a predetermined destination or a prior decision of what the 
outcome should be – in other words, an attitude of constant openness 
towards new possibilities. Or, as Nietzsche (2013 [1886]:viii) describes it, a 
radical quest for “Entfremdung, Erkältung, Ernüchterung”.
e radical openness at stake here has far-reaching consequences. It 
implies breaking out of the narrow binary connes which denes the I/
thou-contrast and the acceptance of a much more complex matrix of 
relationships. Important as the interaction between individuals may be, 
it is only part of a wider web of multiple interactions. But the restriction 
of the self is not limited to binary oppositions. Charles Taylor describes 
how secularism has produced an “exclusive humanism” by deliberately 
removing large parts of human experience from consideration. is 
resulted in a sense of self and its place in the universe that is “not open and 
porous and vulnerable to a world of spirits and powers”. Such a “buered” 
self could not be maintained indenitely. In his remarkable analysis of 
Amos Tutuola’s work and signicance for this debate, Nyamnjoh (2017:8) 
shows how Tutuola was able to combine an openness to a world of spirits, 
powers and cosmic forces, while “still be “enchanted” enough to have the 
condence of Taylor’s “buered” self, exploring one’s own “powers of moral 
ordering”“20. It is this ability to straddle dierent worlds which holds the 
key to an expanded sense of self.
e embracing of complexity not only does better justice to our present 
reality, but also sets us free to consider a variety of alternative possibilities. 
In this regard Kearney (2002:7) makes the case for a critical hermeneutics 
of the stranger which moves beyond binary divides in order to “expose the 
other in the alien and the alien in the other “.
e acceptance of the reality of complexity also means that an irreversible 
de-centring21 of the self has taken place – to which we have already 
referred in our discussion of Levinas. In a complex matrix one node by 
20 I am indebted to Francis Nyamnjoh for drawing my attention to this aspect of Tutuola’s 
work.
21 Kearney (2003:3) describes this as the realization by the ego “that it is never wholly 
sovereign”. It means that the self-suciency of the self can no longer be maintained 
and that the “incompleteness” of the human condition henceforth serves as point 
of departure. Levinas (2003:51) talks in this regard of the restrictions caused by the 
“suciency of the fact of being”.
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denition cannot be the central point. is decentring subverts all forms 
of domination which the self assumes in customary relationships. e 
illusionary power of humans over nature is increasingly being questioned 
by models of sustainable development. In the same vein, it is no longer self-
evident that the self is in control of the relationship with the other. We have 
already noted how Levinas reverses the “normal” order by showing that it 
is the awareness of the (already existing) other which awakens the sense of 
responsibility towards the other as a secondary reaction. In this case the self 
still retains the initiative, but when the stranger assumes this function by 
making an appeal to the self (Waldenfels), a reversal of roles has occurred. 
e self now becomes the “object” of attention, the “receiver” of the action 
which emanates from the other, the one who undergoes change.
is reversal has consequences for all aspects of the relationship between 
the self and the other. Because it goes so much against the grain of 
conventional behaviour and inborn prejudice, it will require a resilient and 
sustainable strategy to have any signicant and lasting eect. Two basic 
components needed for such a strategy are liberation and enrichment.
“Liberation” refers in the rst place to a critical awareness of and a conscious 
eort to distance oneself from embedded stereotypes and prejudice. As 
Simmel points out, because the stranger as outsider is not directly involved, 
he oers a certain “objectivity” that frees us from our preconceived ideas22. 
But the concept has wider ramications. It also implies freeing oneself from 
the connes of a narrow band of defence mechanisms that usually regulate 
relations with the other – mechanisms of justication, demarcation, 
exclusion and entitlement. ere is a much wider spectrum of modalities 
available for shaping the interaction with the other, such as reaching out, 
engaging, inclusion, respect, esteem and reconciliation.
In this regard, unmediated interaction is of cardinal importance. Keeping 
our distance is a well-known strategy to ensure that stereotypes remain 
intact. e nature of the engagement changes when it happens in the 
presence of the other. It is for this reason that Levinas (as we have seen 
above) sets so much store by the face-to-face meeting in his development 
22 “… he (the stranger) is freer practically and theoretically; he surveys conditions with 
less prejudice; his criteria for them are more general and more objective ideals; he is not 
tied down in his action by habit, piety, and precedent” (Simmel 1950[1908]:403).
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of a “hermeneutics of lived experience” (Bergo 2017:1). e importance of 
this factor is conrmed by numerous case studies in the actual practice 
of nding common ground and consensus (cf. Lategan 1998). Of course, 
knowledge of the other and the unmasking of stereotypes can be achieved 
by indirect means, but not as eectively as being in the presence of the 
other. e latter does not eliminate the need for further reection or 
what Ricoeur (1992:1) calls the “primacy of reective meditation over the 
immediate positioning of the subject”, but it does avoid intermediate levels 
which can derail the process of overcoming divisions.
Liberation from self-centeredness and the narrow connes of the own 
perspective is just the rst step. It prepares the ground for a second step, 
namely the ongoing enrichment and broadening of self through the other. 
is requires the recognition of the “radical openness of systems” (Chu 
2003) (in this case the “system” of human relations), which in its turn clears 
the way to give free rein to our imagination and our inborn curiosity. Meyer 
(2011:104) explains the importance of this impulse, while Nietzsche talks 
of the “dangerous curiosity” for an undiscovered world.23
e result is a mind-set which is willing to explore the full reach and all 
the potential which human existence can oer – not only the contingent, 
individual expression of that existence. In this regard, Simmel values the 
“mobility” of the stranger who is not tied to one location or position, but 
who “always nds expansions and new territories” (1950:403). e stranger 
not only evokes a sense of responsibility in us (Levinas), but oers a new 
perspective on life, a dierent understanding of reality, an alternative 
course of action. e stranger thus represents a reservoir of not-yet-lived 
experiences, of not-yet-realised options, of not-yet-implemented strategies.
23 “Ein Antrieb und Andrang waltet und wird über sie Herr wie ein Befehl; ein Wille und 
Wunsch erwacht, fortzugehn, irgend wohin, um jeden Preis; eine heige gefährliche 
Neugierde nach einer unentdeckten Welt ammt und ackert in allen ihren Sinnen. 
“Lieber sterben als hier leben” – so klingt die gebieterische Stimme und Verführung: 
und dies “hier”, dies “zu Hause” ist Alles, was sie bis dahin geliebt hatte! Ein plötzlicher 
Schrecken und Argwohn gegen Das, was sie liebte, ein Blitz von Verachtung gegen 
Das, was ihr “Picht” hiess, ein aufrührerisches, willkürliches, vulkanisch stossendes 
Verlangen nach Wanderscha, Fremde, Entfremdung, Erkältung, Ernüchterung, 
Vereisung … “Nietzsche 2013:Vorrede 3). For a contemporary description of the same 
circumstances, cf. Kearney (2003:4).
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Because what is proposed here is in essence contra-intuitive, it is also 
susceptible to misunderstanding. It is therefore necessary to stress that the 
acceptance of the “radical openness of systems” which is proposed here, 
does not imply the elimination of all boundaries. Aer all, there can only 
be talk of a system if there are limits or borders which distinguish it from 
other systems. What is important, is that these borders are not absolute, 
but porous and that they may change in the course time. At the same time, 
it is not a plea for the abolition of distinctions as part of a postmodern 
discourse. To be able to enrich the self, the other has to remain dierent, 
and the “irreducible non-integration of alterity” (Ziarek 1995:28) respected.
4. e dark side of strangeness
e proposal to explore the positive potential of strangeness may come 
across as a misguided attempt to salvage something from a concept that 
is in its very essence negative. e fact that it is presented as “counter-
intuitive” seems to conrm that it is at odds with common experience. Not 
all encounters with the other and strangeness are benecial. For many, it 
is the epithet for all that is undesirable, menacing and destructive – not 
only in a conceptual sense, but also from existential experience. In view 
of a global surge of antipathy against outsiders, migrants, and uninvited 
refugees who are perceived to be a threat to the established order of things, 
causing shis in power in many countries, culminating in death and 
destruction in the wake of xenophobic violence, we indeed cannot ignore 
the dark side of strangeness. Any plea for the appreciation of the positive 
dimensions of strangeness therefore also have to account for its opposite.
Among many examples of the negative potential of strangeness involving 
even violence and destruction24, we shall look briey at one specic 
instance, namely the eect of the strangeness inherent in the concept of 
“blackness”. We do this at the hand of Achille Mbembe’s analysis of the 
term in his book Critique of Black Reason (2017).
As Mbembe (2017:25–37) shows, “blackness” represents a kaleidoscope 
of meanings and associations, both negative and positive. It can be the 
expression of pride and self-armation, but it can also be the description of 
24 Cf. for example Adam (2011); Adam & Moodley 2013; Nyamnjoh 2016.
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denigration, backwardness and all things undesirable. Two, intermingled 
narratives are at play here. e one, which Mbembe calls the “Western 
consciousness of Blackness”, proceeds from questions like: Who is he? 
What dierentiates him from us? Can he become like us? How shall I 
deal with him? e self remains the measure and the centre of meaning. 
“From this perspective, anything that is not identical to that I is abnormal” 
(2017:28). e second narrative proceeds from questions like: Who am I? 
Am I what people say I am? What is my real social status, my real history? 
“If the Western consciousness of the Black man is an identity judgement, 
this second narrative is, in contrast, a declaration of identity” (2017:28).
In all of this, a process of estrangement is taking place – from the other but 
also from the self. In order to create distance from the undesirable, the latter 
is depicted as not being part of the self (we are not like this), as unfamiliar, 
menacing, dangerous. At the same time, the second narrative also involves 
taking distance from the self. Am I really what others think I am?
e important point for our theme is that the strangeness at stake here 
is an imposed strangeness. It concerns attributes that are projected on the 
other, not how the other necessarily sees and understands him- or herself. 
In essence, this is what constitutes racism – dierentiation by ascribing 
something external and negative to the other25. “Racism consists, most 
of all, in substituting what is with something else, with another reality” 
(Mbembe 2017:32).
is form of strangeness – the strangeness providing the rationale for 
racism – is also in need of liberation and expansion. As has oen been 
pointed out, the discrimination, injustice and trauma inicted by the policy 
and practice of treating the other as dierent, inferior and not having the 
same rights have wounded perpetrator and victim alike, producing what 
Mbembe (2017:36) calls a “mutilated humanity”.
e rst step required is unmasking the lie underpinning the imposed 
strangeness. For the perpetrator, it means demolishing existing stereotypes 
and discovering a shared humanity in the encounter with the other. For 
25 “Race and racism also have the fundamental characteristic of always inciting and 
engendering a double, a substitute, an equivalent, a mask, a simulacrum. A real human 
face comes into view. e work of racism consists in relegating it to the background or 
covering it with a veil” (Mbembe 2017:32).
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the victim, it is an even more arduous task involving a two-fold challenge: 
Breaking through the hard crust of an imposed and false identity, discarding 
the burden of a negative self-image and secondly, reconnecting with the 
real self and nding ways to express the fullness of an untrammelled and 
liberated identity.
Both those in a dominating position and those who are dominated are 
furthermore in need of expansion as second step, but along dierent routes.26 
For the traditional dominators, be they colonialists, empire builders or 
racists, the unmasked other not only contradicts their ingrained prejudices, 
but also becomes a source of new possibilities far beyond the narrowness 
of an isolated existence. For the dominated, the other in the guise of the 
dominating party oers a contradictory proposition. On the one hand, it is 
the opposite of all one should aspire to, on the other hand it represents all 
the benets the dominated had to forego. e real alternative in this case is 
the imagined other which not only breaks the mould of existing reality, but 
opens up unlimited possibilities for an alternative existence.
e dark side of strangeness thus does not contradict the constructive 
potential of strangeness, but reconrms the need for liberation and 
expansion. In fact, it reveals the existential necessity of strangeness and the 
constitutive power of the other. e liberation of the erstwhile dominator 
depends on the presence of the real other, while the realisation of the full 
potential of the formerly dominated depends on the imagined other.
5. Conclusion
Does the encounter with the other then in the end lead back to the self? 
Is the pious talk of taking the stranger seriously and learning from the 
other just a new variation of narcissism, a new conrmation of the self-
centeredness of the self?
It is essential to return to the self – not for the sake of self-armation, but 
to ensure that our default self-centeredness is eectively changed. is is 
26 How quickly the former dominated can revert to the role of the new dominator is 
illustrated by recent events in our immediate environment. Recent events in Zimbabwe 
and South Africa make clear that “liberator” and “suppressor” are not permanent 
epithets, but roles that can be assumed interchangeably by the very same individual or 
group.
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aer all where change begins. But we are returning – via the detour of the 
other – not to the same “I”, but to one that is hopefully de-centred, now on 
the receiving end of the action and no longer dominating the encounter, 
focused not on defence and justication in the rst place, but on liberation 
and enrichment.
e question still remains: Have we really grasped the hermeneutical 
potential of the other and taken full advantage of the “surplus” that is 
available? As we have seen above, many facets of the other and of strangeness 
have already been explored, leading to important insights27 – such as seeing 
our own face in the mirror of the other; recognising ourselves in the other; 
understanding ourselves in terms of “strangeness”; untangling the riddle 
of the self and the other; distinguishing between dierent kinds of self 
and dierent kinds of other; opening ourselves completely to the other; 
accepting ourselves as the other; making the stranger more familiar and 
the self more strange; respecting and welcoming the stranger; appreciating 
the other as catalyst; nding a therapy for strangeness; and developing a 
“grammar of living together”.
But is there not more to expect from the impact of the other on the self? 
Has the liberation and enrichment of the self through the other really been 
achieved? Aer all, more than understanding is at stake here – in the end 
it is about change. And – as Epictetus and his fellow Stoics already taught 
us – the starting point of change is ourselves. To give a twist to Marx: e 
challenge is not merely to understand the other (and the world), but to 
change the self through the other.
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